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Abstract— Suppose that Alice wishes to send messages to Bob
through a communication channel C1, but her transmissions also
reach an eavesdropper Eve through another channel C2. This is
the wiretap channel model introduced by Wyner in 1975. The goal
is to design a coding scheme that makes it possible for Alice to
communicate both reliably and securely. Reliability is measured
in terms of Bob’s probability of error in recovering the message,
while security is measured in terms of the mutual information be-
tween the message and Eve’s observations. Wyner showed that
the situation is characterized by a single constant Cs, called the
secrecy capacity, which has the following meaning: for all ε > 0,
there exist coding schemes of rate R > Cs − ε that asymptotically
achieve both the reliability and the security objectives. However,
his proof of this result is based upon a nonconstructive random-
coding argument. To date, despite a considerable research effort,
the only case where we know how to construct coding schemes that
achieve secrecy capacity is when Eve’s channel C2 is an erasure
channel, or a combinatorial variation thereof.
Polar codes were recently invented by Arıkan; they approach
the capacity of symmetric binary-input discrete memoryless chan-
nels with low encoding and decoding complexity. In this paper, we
use polar codes to construct a coding scheme that achieves the se-
crecy capacity for a wide range of wiretap channels. Our construc-
tion works for any instantiation of the wiretap channel model, as
long as both C1 and C2 are symmetric and binary-input, and C2 is
degraded with respect to C1. Moreover, we show how to modify our
construction in order to provide strong security, in the sense de-
fined by Maurer, while still operating at a rate that approaches the
secrecy capacity. In this case, we cannot guarantee that the relia-
bility condition will also be satisfied unless the main channel C1 is
noiseless, although we believe it can be always satisfied in practice.
Index Terms— channel polarization, information-theoretic secu-
rity, polar codes, secrecy capacity, strong security, wiretap channel
I. INTRODUCTION
THE notion of wiretap channels was introduced by AaronWyner [42] in 1975. In this setting, Alice wishes to send
messages to Bob through a communication channel C1, called
the main channel, but her transmissions also reach an adversary
Eve through another channel C2, called the wiretap channel.
This is illustrated in Figure 1, wherein U denotes a k-bit mes-
sage that Alice wishes to communicate to Bob. We think of U
as a random variable that takes values in {0, 1}k; unlike most
papers on wiretap channels, we do not assume anything regard-
ing the a priori distribution of U. While making use of auxiliary
random bits, the encoder maps U into a sequence X of n chan-
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Figure 1. Block diagram of a generic wiretap-channel system
nel symbols. This sequence is transmitted across the main chan-
nel and the wiretap channel resulting in the corresponding chan-
nel outputs Y and Z. Finally, the decoder maps Y (deterministi-
cally) into an estimate Û of the original message.
The goal is to design a coding scheme — namely, an encod-
ing algorithm and a decoding algorithm — that makes it possi-
ble to communicate both reliably and securely, as the message
length k tends to infinity. Reliability is measured in terms of the
probability of error in recovering the message. Specifically, the
objective is to satisfy the following
Reliability Condition: lim
k→∞
Pr
{
Û 6= U} = 0 (1)
where the probability is over all the relevant coin tosses in the
system: in the generation of U, in the encoder, and in the main
channel. Security is usually measured in terms of the normal-
ized mutual information between the message U and Eve’s
observations Z. Specifically, one is interested in encoding algo-
rithms that satisfy the following
Security Condition: lim
k→∞
I(U; Z)
k
= 0 (2)
Note that I(U; Z) is equal to the difference between the a priori
entropy H(U) and the conditional entropy H(U|Z). Thus, intu-
itively, (2) means that observing Z does not provide much infor-
mation about U beyond what is available a priori, as compared
to the message length k. Maurer argued in [28,29] that the con-
ventional notion of security (2) is much too weak. Indeed, it is
easy to construct examples where k1−ε out of the k message bits
are disclosed to Eve, while still satisfying (2). This is clearly un-
acceptable. Thus Maurer introduced in [28] an alternative
Strong Security Condition: lim
k→∞
I(U; Z) = 0 (3)
Notice that both security conditions (2) and (3) are information-
theoretic rather than computational: the adversary is assumed to
be computationally unbounded, and security does not depend
on computational hardness assumptions of any kind.
2 MAHDAVIFAR AND VARDY: ACHIEVING THE SECRECY CAPACITY OF WIRETAP CHANNELS USING POLAR CODES
A. Prior Work
In 1975, Wyner [42] considered a special case of the system in
Figure 1 where both C1 and C2 are discrete memoryless chan-
nels (DMCs) and, moreover, C2 is degraded with respect to C1.
He proved that such a system is characterized by a single con-
stant Cs, called the secrecy capacity, which has the following
meaning. For all ε > 0, there exist coding schemes of informa-
tion rate R > Cs − ε that satisfy (1) and (2); conversely, it is not
possible to satisfy both (1) and (2) at rates greater than Cs. Since
1975, Wyner’s results have been extended to a variety of con-
texts, most notably Gaussian channels [23], general broadcast
channels with confidential messages [12], and channels that im-
pose a combinatorial (rather than probabilistic) constraint on
the adversary [8,33]. In fact, the literature on wiretap channels
encompasses, by now, hundreds of papers.
However, the vast majority of this work relies on noncon-
structive random-coding arguments to establish the main re-
sults. Such results show that there exist codes that achieve se-
crecy capacity, but are of little use if one’s goal is to design
specific polynomial-time encoding/decoding algorithms. To the
best of our knowledge, constructive solutions to the wiretap-
channel problem are available only in two special cases. The
first special case is when the main channel is noiseless and the
wiretap channel is the binary erasure channel (BEC). A coding
scheme for this case, using LDPC codes for the BEC, was pre-
sented in [37,39] and proved to achieve secrecy capacity. The
other special case is when the adversary is constrained combi-
natorially: Eve can select to observe some t out of the n trans-
mitted symbols, while the remaining n− t symbols are erased.
This situation, studied by Ozarow and Wyner in [33], may be
regarded as a combinatorial variation of an erasure channel.
Provably optimal coding schemes for this case can be construc-
ted from MDS codes [41], or using extractors [8]. We observe,
however, that even for the simple situation where C1 is noise-
less and C2 is a binary symmetric channel, it is not known how
to explicitly construct codes that achieve secrecy capacity.
We point out that a general method of coding for the wiretap
channel, often referred to as coset-coding or syndrome-coding,
is well known. This method goes back to the work of Wyner [33,
42], although it was significantly extended and generalized in
[9,10] and other papers. Assume, for simplicity, that the input
alphabet of both C1 and C2 is binary. In this case, the coset-
coding method utilizes two binary linear codes: an “outer” code
C∗ and an “inner” code C, such that C ⊂ C∗ and the difference
dim(C∗)− dim(C) between their dimensions is k. This con-
dition implies that C∗ can be partitioned into 2k cosets of C.
A message u ∈ {0, 1}k is conveyed by Alice via the choice of
one of these 2k cosets, say a + C. What is transmitted by Alice
is a vector X that is selected uniformly at random from a + C.
Loosely speaking, the outer code C∗ serves to correct the er-
rors on the main channel, and thus ensures reliability, while the
inner code C, over which X is randomized, ensures security.
The trouble is that it is not known how to explicitly construct
a sequence of outer codes C∗ and inner codes C that satisfy
conditions (1) and (2) at a rate that approaches the secrecy ca-
pacity as n→∞. The work of Cohen and Ze´mor [9,10] shows
that a random choice of the inner code C suffices to achieve
strong security, in a very general setting. Notably, the proof of
this result in [9,10] does not assume that the messages are uni-
formly random a priori. Still, to the best of our knowledge, the
only cases where explicit constructions of C and C∗ are known
are those described in the foregoing paragraph (cf. [37,39]).
B. Our Contributions
In this paper, we present a coding scheme that achieves the se-
crecy capacity of wiretap channels whenever C1 and C2 are
binary-input symmetric DMCs and C2 is degraded with respect
to C1. This is the situation originally studied by Wyner; it in-
cludes the important special case where C1 and C2 are arbitrary
binary symmetric channels. We are able to satisfy the reliability
and security conditions (1) and (2) with explicit polynomial-
time encoding/decoding algorithms. In fact, the number of op-
erations required for encoding and decoding is only O(n log n).
Our construction is based upon key results in the literature on
polar codes, recently invented by Arıkan [3].
It is proved in [3] that polar codes achieve the capacity of ar-
bitrary binary-input symmetric DMCs, with low encoding and
decoding complexity. The proof of this result is based on a phe-
nomenon called channel polarization. Let
G =
[
1 0
1 1
]
(4)
and let G⊗m denote the m-th Kronecker power of G. Let W be
a symmetric binary-input DMC, and let V = (V1, V2, . . . , Vn)
be a block of n = 2m bits chosen uniformly at random from
{0, 1}n. Suppose V is encoded as X = VPnG⊗m, where Pn is
the n × n bit-reversal permutation matrix. Finally, X is trans-
mitted through n independent copies of W, as shown below:
.
.
.
.
.
.
PSfrag replacements
U
X
Y
Z
Û
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Arıkan [3] considered the n channels “seen” by each of the n in-
dividual bits V1, V2, . . . , Vn as they undergo the transformation
in (5). Let us call them the bit-channels — for a precise defini-
tion of the notion of a bit-channel, see [3] and Section III. It is
shown in [3] that as m grows, the bit-channels start polarizing:
they approach either a noiseless channel or a pure-noise chan-
nel. We will say that the former bit-channels are good while the
latter are bad (again, see Section III for a rigorous definition).
One of the key results of [3] is that the fraction of bit-channels
that are good approaches the capacity of W as n → ∞.
Given the channel polarization phenomenon, the general idea
of our construction is quite simple. We will transmit random
bits over those bit-channels that are good for both Eve and Bob,
information bits over those bit-channels that are good for Bob
but bad for Eve, and zeros over those bit-channels that are bad
for both Bob and Eve. In the rest of this paper, we make this
idea precise and prove that it works.
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In Section II, we briefly recap relevant results from the litera-
ture on wiretap channels, in order to obtain a simple expression
for the secrecy capacity Cs in the case where C1 and C2 are sym-
metric DMCs and C2 is degraded with respect to C1. In Sec-
tion III, we provide the necessary background on polar codes
and establish a certain property of channel polarization that is
crucial for our construction (Lemma 4). The construction itself,
namely the proposed coding scheme, is presented in Section IV.
In Section V, we prove that the proposed coding scheme satis-
fies the reliability and security conditions (1) and (2). We also
show in Section V that the rate k/n of our coding scheme ap-
proaches the secrecy capacity Cs as n → ∞.
In Section VI, we consider the stronger notion of security (3).
It was shown by Maurer-Wolf [29] that any coding scheme that
satisfies the “weak” security condition (2) can be converted into
a coding scheme that satisfies the stronger condition (3). This
is accomplished using an ingenious information reconciliation
and privacy amplification protocol [7]. Although, in principle,
the rate overhead necessary for privacy amplification can be
made arbitrarily small, this is unlikely to be the case in practice.
In Section VI, we show how to modify the coding scheme of
Section IV in order to guarantee strong security directly, with-
out the need for privacy amplification. This is achieved by suit-
ably modifying our definition of “bad” bit-channels, in a man-
ner that differs from the generally accepted notions [3]. As a re-
sult, under the modified definition, a vanishing fraction of bit-
channels could be good for Eve but bad for Bob, even when the
wiretap channel is degraded with respect to the main channel.
In this situation, the rate of the coding scheme of Section VI
still approaches the secrecy capacity Cs, but we cannot guaran-
tee that the reliability condition (1) is satisfied, unless the main
channel is noiseless. Nevertheless, we believe that, in practice,
acceptably low probabilities of error could be achieved on the
main channel (using a more elaborate decoding algorithm).
We conclude the paper in Section VII with a brief discussion
of further results. In particular, we explain in Section VII that our
construction generalizes straightforwardly to the case where the
channels C1 and C2 are not symmetric, although in this case po-
lar codes become less explicit and only the “symmetric secrecy
capacity” can be achieved. A few open problems that stem from
our results herein are also discussed in Section VII.
C. Related Work
Following the publication of a preliminary version of this paper
in [25] and [26], several related papers have appeared [1,17,21].
Most notably, the work of Hof and Shamai [17] on polar cod-
ing for wiretap channels is independent and contemporaneous
to ours. While some of the main results in [17] and in this paper
are similar, there are important differences that we would like
to emphasize. One key difference is that Hof and Shamai [17]
analyze their polar-coding scheme in detail, including recursive
channel combining and splitting, whereas we treat polar codes
essentially as a black box. We believe this makes our proof both
shorter and clearer.
There are also significant differences between the results es-
tablished in [1,17,21] and in this paper. In particular, it is shown
in [1,17] that polar coding achieves the entire rate-equivocation
region (see [24] for a definition), whereas we are interested only
in the extreme point of this region that corresponds to secrecy
capacity. On the other hand, in several other respects, our results
are stronger than those of [1,17,21]. First, the proof in [1,17] is
contingent on the assumption that the message U is a priori uni-
form over {0, 1}k, whereas we do not place any constraints on
the a priori distribution of U. Assuming that messages are a pri-
ori uniform is common in information theory, but such assump-
tions are completely unacceptable in cryptography [6,15]. Even
more importantly, we show how polar coding should be used to
provide strong security, whereas the work of [1,17,21] pro-
vides weak security only. Again, in cryptographic applications,
conventional weak security is usually unacceptable.
II. SECRECY CAPACITY
In this section, we first establish some relevant terminology. We
then briefly recap the results of [12,22] to provide a simple ex-
pression for the secrecy capacity Cs in the case where C1 and C2
are symmetric DMCs and C2 is degraded with respect to C1.
We will limit our consideration to finite-input and finite-out-
put discrete memoryless channels throughout. Such a channel
is a triple 〈X , Y , W〉, where X , Y are finite sets and W is
an |X | × |Y | matrix with W[x, y] being the probability of re-
ceiving y ∈Y given that x ∈X was sent. We will follow the
convention of [3,4,19] and write W(y|x) instead of W[x, y].
A matrix M is strongly symmetric if the rows of M are per-
mutations of each other and the columns of M are permuta-
tions of each other. A channel 〈X , Y , W〉 is strongly symmet-
ric if W is a strongly symmetric matrix. Following [3,4,14,19],
we will say that 〈X , Y , W〉 is symmetric (often called output-
symmetric) if the columns of W can be partitioned into subsets
such that each subset forms a strongly symmetric matrix. The
capacity of a symmetric channel 〈X , Y , W〉 is given by
C(W) def= H(X)− H(X|Y) = log2|X | − H(X|Y) (6)
where the random variable X at the input to the channel is uni-
form over X , and Y is the corresponding random variable at
the channel output (for a proof of this fact, see [14, p. 94]). An
important example of a symmetric channel is the binary sym-
metric channel BSC(p) =
〈{0, 1}, {0, 1}, W〉 with
W =
[
1−p p
p 1−p
]
Given a channel C1 = 〈X , Y , W1〉, we say that another chan-
nel C2 = 〈X , Z , W2〉 is degraded with respect to C1 if there
exists a third channel C3 = 〈Y , Z , W3〉 such that C2 is the
cascade of C1 and C3. Specifically, it is required that
W2(z|x) = ∑
y∈Y
W1(y|x)W3(z|y) (7)
for all x∈X and z∈Z . Note that whenever p2> p1, the chan-
nel C2 = BSC(p2) is degraded with respect to C1 = BSC(p1).
The secrecy capacity Cs of the wiretap-channel system in Fig-
ure 1 is defined as follows. First, assume that the message U is
uniformly random over {0, 1}k. Then Cs is the supremum over
all rates R = k/n (in bits per channel use) such that there exist
coding schemes of rate R satisfying conditions (1) and (2). For
the general case where C1 and C2 are arbitrary DMCs, comput-
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ing the secrecy capacity is a difficult problem. Let X denote the
single-letter input to C1 and C2, let Y and Z denote the corre-
sponding single-letter outputs. The best known expression for
the secrecy capacity Cs, given by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner in [12], is
Cs = max
U
(
I(U; Y)− I(U; Z)
)
where the maximum is taken over all random variables U such
that U→X→ (Y, Z) is a Markov chain. The problem is that
this maximization is often difficult to evaluate, and there is no
simpler expression for the secrecy capacity even when C1 and C2
are both strongly symmetric, unless additional constraints are
satisfied. See [24,40] for more details on this.
However, when C1 = 〈X , Y , W∗〉 and C2 = 〈X , Z , W〉 are
symmetric and C2 is degraded with respect to C1, a simple ex-
pression for Cs was given by Leung-Yan-Cheong in [22]. It is
shown in [22, Theorem 4] that in this case
Cs = C(W∗)− C(W) = H(X|Z)− H(X|Y) (8)
where X is uniform over X . In particular, if the main channel is
BSC(p1) while the wiretap channel is BSC(p2), with p2 > p1,
then the secrecy capacity is given by h2(p2) − h2(p1), where
h2(·) is the binary entropy function.
III. POLAR CODES
This section provides a concise overview of the groundbreak-
ing work of Arıkan [3] and others [4,19,20] on polar codes and
channel polarization. We establish only those results that are es-
sential for the coding schemes presented in this paper.
As in [16,20], we consider exclusively binary-input symmet-
ric memoryless (BSM) discrete channels. Such a channel is
a symmetric DMC, as defined in the previous section, with in-
put alphabet X = {0, 1}. With a slight abuse of notation, we
will often follow [3,4,20] and simply write W to denote a BSM
channel
〈{0, 1}, Y , W〉. The Bhattacharyya parameter of W is
Z(W)
def
= ∑
y∈Y
√
W(y|0)W(y|1)
It can be shown that Z(W) always takes values in [0, 1]. Intu-
itively, channels with Z(W)6 ε are almost noiseless, while
channels with Z(W) > 1− ε are almost pure-noise channels.
This intuition is made precise in [3, Proposition 1].
Arıkan [3] introduces a number of channels that are associ-
ated with the transformation in (5). First, there is the channel〈{0, 1}n, Y n, Wn〉 given by
Wn(y|x) def=
n
∏
i=1
W(yi|xi) (9)
where x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn). This is the
channel that results from n independent uses of the channel W.
Next, for all n = 2m, let us define the Arıkan transform matrix
Gn
def
= PnG⊗m, where G is the matrix in (4) and Pn is the bit-re-
versal permutation matrix defined in [3, Section VII-B]. Arıkan
then introduces the “combined” channel
〈{0, 1}n, Y n, W˜〉with
transition probabilities given by
W˜(y|v) def= Wn(y ∣∣vGn) = Wn(y ∣∣v PnG⊗m) (10)
This is the channel seen by the random vector (V1, V2, . . . , Vn)
as it undergoes the transformation in (5). Arıkan [3] also defines
the channel
〈{0, 1}, Y n×{0, 1}i−1, Wi〉 that is seen by the i-th
bit Vi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, as follows. Let vi = (v1, v2, . . . , vi)
denote a binary vector of length i, with the convention that v0
is the empty string and that {0, 1}0 = {v0}. Then
Wi
(
y, vi−1|vi) def= 1
2n−1 ∑
v∈{0,1}n−i
W˜
(
y
∣∣ (vi−1, vi, v)) (11)
where (·, ·) denotes vector concatenation. It is easy to show (cf.
Lemma 14) that Wi
(
y, vi−1|vi) is indeed the probability of the
event that (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn) = y and (V1, V2, . . . , Vi−1) = vi−1
given the event Vi = vi, provided V = (V1, V2, . . . , Vn) is a pri-
ori uniform over {0, 1}n. Consequently, if one considers a “hy-
pothetical decoder” that attempts to estimate the i-th bit Vi hav-
ing observed y and vi−1, then Wi is the effective channel seen
by such decoder (again, provided V is a priori uniform). We
will refer to Wi as the i-th bit-channel, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Observe that the optimal decision rule for the hypothetical
decoder of the foregoing paragraph is trivial: decide v̂i = 0 if
Wi
(
y, vi−1|0) > Wi
(
y, vi−1|1) (12)
and v̂i = 1 otherwise. One can invoke this decision rule iterati-
vely for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n, while substituting the first i − 1 de-
cisions (v̂1, v̂2, . . . , v̂i−1) in place of the hypothetical observa-
tions vi−1. Up to a small modification described later, this is the
successive cancellation decoder invented by Arıkan [3].
Following [4,19], let us partition the n bit-channels into good
channels and bad channels as follows. Let [n] def= {1, 2, . . . , n}
and let β< 1/2 be a fixed positive constant. Then the index sets
of the good and bad channels are given by
Gn(W, β) def=
{
i ∈ [n] : Z(Wi) < 2−nβ/n
}
(13)
Bn(W, β) def=
{
i ∈ [n] : Z(Wi) > 2−n
β
/n
}
(14)
One of the key results of [3,4] is that the fraction of the good
channels approaches the channel capacity C(W), given by (6),
as n → ∞. We state this result precisely as follows.
Theorem 1. For any BSM channel W and any constant β< 1/2
we have
lim
n→∞
|Gn(W, β)|
n
= C(W)
Theorem 1 readily leads to a construction of capacity-achie-
ving polar codes. The general idea is to transmit the informa-
tion bits over the good bit-channels while fixing the input to the
bad bit-channels to a priori known values, say zeros1. Formally,
given a vector v of length n and a setA ⊆ [n], let vA denote the
projection of v on the coordinates inA. Each subsetA of [n] of
size |A| = k specifies a polar code Cn(A) of rate k/n. We de-
fine Cn(A) via its encoder map E : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n. Given
a message u∈{0, 1}k, the encoder proceeds in two steps. First,
the encoder constructs the vector v∈{0, 1}n, by setting vA = u
and vAc = 0, where Ac is the complement of A in [n] and 0 is
1In the work of [3, 4], which deals with symmetric as well as non-symmetric
DMCs, it is important to allow an arbitrary choice of these “frozen” values.
However, it is also shown in [3] that in the case of symmetric channels, any
choice is as good as any other. Since we are concerned exclusively with sym-
metric channels in this paper, we will use zeros for notational convenience.
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the all-zero vector. Next, it outputs E (u) = vGn as in (5). The
decoder we will use for Cn(A) is the successive cancellation
decoder of Arıkan [3]. This decoder works as already described
in (12), with one straightforward modification: for i ∈ Ac, the
decision rule is simply v̂i = 0.
The key property of the encoder-decoder pair of the forego-
ing paragraph is summarized in the following theorem. This the-
orem is (the second part of) Proposition 2 of Arıkan [3].
Theorem 2. Let W be a BSM channel and let A be an arbit-
rary subset of [n] of size |A| = k. Suppose that a message U is
chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}k, encoded as a code-
word of Cn(A), and transmitted over W. Then the probability
that the channel output is not decoded to U under successive
cancellation decoding satisfies
Pr
{
Û 6= U} 6 ∑
i∈A
Z(Wi) (15)
In this paper, we need a result that is somewhat stronger than
Theorem 2, since we do not assume that messages are chosen
uniformly at random from {0, 1}k. Fortunately, such a result can
be readily established using the machinery that was already de-
veloped by Arıkan [3] for symmetric channels. Indeed, for sym-
metric channels, it is well known that the error probability is in-
dependent of the transmitted codeword; hence, the input distri-
bution should not matter. The following proposition makes this
observation precise. We include a proof, for completeness.
Proposition3. Let W be a BSM channel and let A be an arbit-
rary subset of [n] of size |A| = k. Suppose that a message U is
chosen according to an arbitrary distribution from {0, 1}k, en-
coded as a codeword of Cn(A), and transmitted over W. Then
the probability Pe that the channel output is not decoded to U
under successive cancellation decoding satisfies
Pe 6 ∑
i∈A
Z(Wi) (16)
Proof. Following Arıkan [3, Section V], we consider the sam-
ple space Ωn = {0, 1}n ×Y n with the probability measure
Pr
{
(v, y)
} def
= 2−nW˜(y|v) (17)
for all v ∈ {0, 1}n and y ∈Y n. On this probability space, Arı-
kan [3] defines the event E of block error as the set of all pairs
(v, y) in Ωn such that the channel output y is not decoded to vA
under successive cancellation decoding. Let us further define,
for all w ∈ {0, 1}n, the event
Vw
def
=
{
(v, y)∈ Ωn : v = w
}
(18)
It is shown in [3, Proposition 2] that under the probability mea-
sure in (17) we have
Pr
{
E
}
6 ∑
i∈A
Z(Wi) (19)
It is furthermore shown in [3, Section VI-B] that, provided ties
in the decision rule (12) are broken at random, the events E and
Vw are independent for all w. In other words,
Pr
{
E
∣∣Vw} = Pr{E } for all w ∈ {0, 1}n (20)
Now consider the situation where the a priori distribution on the
messages in {0, 1}k is a delta-function. That is, a specific mes-
sage u∈ {0, 1}k is always chosen with probability 1, and the
input to the transformation in (5) is the vector w with wA = u
and wAc = 0. Let Pe(u) denote the probability that the succes-
sive cancellation decoder does not decode the corresponding
channel output y to wA. Then it follows from (10) that
Pe(u) = ∑
y∈F (wA)
W˜(y|w) (21)
whereF (wA) is the set of channel outputs that are not decoded
to wA by the successive cancellation decoder. Observe that
E ∩ Vw =
{
(v, y)∈ Ωn : v = w and y∈F (wA)
}
Therefore, the probability of the event E ∩ Vw, under the prob-
ability measure in (17), can be expressed as
Pr
{
E ∩Vw
}
= ∑
y∈E∩Vw
2−nW˜(y|v) = 2−n ∑
y∈F (wA)
W˜(y|w) (22)
It can be readily seen from (18) that Pr {Vw} = 2−n for all w.
Hence, it follows from (20) that
Pr
{
E ∩Vw
}
= Pr
{
E
∣∣Vw}Pr {Vw} = 2−n Pr{E } (23)
Combining (21), (22), (23), we conclude that Pe(u) = Pr
{
E
}
.
Since this holds for all u ∈ {0, 1}k, we have
Pe = ∑
u∈{0,1}n
Pe(u) Pr
{
U = u
}
= Pr
{
E
}
for any probability distribution Pr
{
U = u
}
on {0, 1}k. Hence,
the proposition now follows from (19).
In order to establish our main result in Section V, we also
need to consider a slightly different encoding and decoding sce-
nario. In this variation, the encoder E ′ is no longer determinis-
tic. Rather, it has access to random bits and selects VAc at ran-
dom, according to some fixed (but otherwise arbitrary) proba-
bility distribution on {0, 1}n−k. In all other respects, E ′ is iden-
tical to the encoder E for Cn(A) described above. The specific
realization vAc of VAc is revealed to the decoder by a genie. The
decoder uses successive cancellation, with the suitable modifi-
cation: for i ∈Ac, the value of v̂i is not set to zero, but rather
to the corresponding coordinate in the realization vAc (revealed
by the genie). Let P′e denote the probability of block error in
this scenario. It is shown in [3, Section VI] that Theorem 2 still
applies in this case, namely
P′e 6 ∑
i∈A
Z(Wi) (24)
The coding scheme presented in the next section relies cru-
cially on one more result from the literature on polar codes. The
following lemma was proved by Korada in [19, Lemma 4.7].
Lemma 4. Let W and W∗ be BSM channels such that W is de-
graded with respect to W∗. For n = 2m, let W1, W2, . . . , Wn
and W∗1 , W∗2 , . . . , W∗n denote the n corresponding bit-channels.
Then Wi is degraded with respect to W∗i for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
and therefore C(Wi) 6 C(W∗i ) and Z(Wi) > Z(W∗i ).
It follows immediately from Lemma 4 and (13) that if W is de-
graded with respect to W∗, then the set of good bit-channels for
W is a subset of the set of good bit-channels for W∗. More pre-
cisely, we have Gn(W, β) ⊆ Gn(W∗, β) for all constants β.
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IV. THE CODING SCHEME
We consider a special case of the wiretap-channel system of
Figure 1, wherein both the main channel C1 = 〈{0, 1}, Y , W∗〉
and Eve’s wiretap channel C2 = 〈{0, 1}, Z , W〉 are symmetric
DMCs, and C2 is degraded with respect to C1. The proposed
coding scheme is illustrated informally below:
.
.
bit−channels bad for
both Bob and Eve
Bob but bad for Eve
both Bob and Eve
bit−channels good for
bit−channels good for
.
PSfrag replacements
U
X
Y
Z
Û
C1
C2 random
bits
zeros
information
bits
row-permuted version of G⊗m
X1
X2
Xn
(25)
The general idea is to transmit information only over those bit-
channels that are bad for Eve, while flooding those bit channels
that are good for Eve with random bits. Formally, we fix a pos-
itive constant β < 1/2 and define three subsets of [n] as follows:
R def= Gn(W, β) (26)
A def= Gn(W∗, β) \ Gn(W, β) (27)
B def= Bn(W∗, β) (28)
Notice that the sets R,A,B are disjoint andR∪A∪ B = [n].
This is so since Gn(W∗, β) and Bn(W∗, β) are complements of
each other by definition, and Gn(W, β) ⊆ Gn(W∗, β) by Lem-
ma 4. Let |R| = r and |A| = k. We are now ready to describe
the proposed encoding and decoding algorithms.
Encoding Algorithm: Formally, the encoder is a function
E : {0, 1}k×{0, 1}r→ {0, 1}n. It accepts as input a mes-
sage u ∈ {0, 1}k and a vector e ∈ {0, 1}r. We make no as-
sumptions about u at this point, but we assume that e is
selected by Alice uniformly at random from {0, 1}r. The
encoder first constructs the vector v∈{0, 1}n, by setting
vR = e, vA = u, and vB = 0. The encoder then outputs
E (u, e) := vGn = v PnG⊗m as in (5).
Decoding Algorithm: Formally, the decoder is a function
D : Y n → {0, 1}k. It accepts as input a vector y ∈Y n at
the output of the main channel C1 = 〈{0, 1}, Y , W∗〉. It
then invokes successive cancellation decoding for the po-
lar code Cn(A∪R), used over W∗, to produce the vec-
tor v̂∈{0, 1}n. The decoder outputs D(y) := v̂A.
We defer the proof that this coding scheme satisfies the reliabil-
ity and security conditions (1), (2) to the next section. The rest
of this section is devoted to two remarks about our construction.
Remark. We point out that our encoding algorithm can be re-
garded as a special case of the coset-coding method described in
Section I-A. Recall that the coset-coding scheme is based upon
an outer code C∗ that provides error-correction on the main
channel and an inner code C ⊂ C∗ that ensures security for the
wiretap channel. In our encoding algorithm, the outer code is
C∗= Cn(A∪R) and the inner code is C = Cn(R). 
Remark. Given the channel polarization phenomenon, it’s intu-
itively clear from (25) why the proposed coding scheme should
work. The information bits U = (U1, U2, . . . , Uk) reach Bob
via good (almost noiseless) bit-channels. Thus Bob should be
able to reconstruct them with very high probability. On the other
hand, these same bits pass through bad (almost pure-noise) bit-
channels on their way to Eve. Thus Eve should not be able to de-
duce much information about U from her observations Z, and
H(U|Z) should be close to H(U).
However, this simple intuition is misleading, because it does
not show how the random bits in (25) help keep Eve ignorant. It
may appear that this randomness is not really needed. For exam-
ple, what would happen if the vector e that serves as the second
input to our encoder function E (·, ·) is not chosen at random
from {0, 1}r but rather set to an a priori fixed value? Since the
channels are symmetric, any fixed value is as good as any other,
so we may as well assume e = 0. This does not seem to affect
the argument in the foregoing paragraph and, according to this
argument, H(U|Z) would still be close to H(U).
In fact, this is not true. The reason is that channels seen by
individual input bits as they undergo the transformation in (5)
depend on the distribution of other input bits. Specifically, if
e= 0 or e is fixed, the resulting encoder will not be secure. This
is an important point that we would like to establish rigorously.
To do so, we first need the following simple lemma.
Lemma 5. Let S be an arbitrary subset of [n] of size k, and sup-
pose that the polar code Cn(S) is used to communicate over
a BSM channel 〈{0, 1}, Z , W〉. Further, assume that the mes-
sage U at the input to the encoder for Cn(S) is uniformly ran-
dom over {0, 1}k, and let Z denote the random vector at the
channel output. Then I(U; Z)> kC(W).
Proof. In fact, the lemma is true not only for Cn(S) but for
any binary linear code of dimension k. The only property of the
transform matrix Gn that we need is that it is nonsingular.
Let V be the random vector obtained by setting VS = U and
VS c = 0. Then the codeword transmitted over the channel is
X = V Gn = U M (29)
where M is a k × n row submatrix of Gn. Since Gn is nonsin-
gular, rank(M) = k and there exists a subset T of [n] of size k
such that the corresponding k columns of M are linearly inde-
pendent. This implies that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between U and XT . Hence, I(U; Z) = I(XT ; Z). Furthermore,
since the random vector U is uniform over {0, 1}k, so is the
vector XT . Equivalently, its components {Xi : i ∈ T } are i.i.d.
Ber(1/2) random variables, and we can further conclude that
I(XT ; Z) > I(XT ; ZT ) = ∑
i∈T
I(Xi; Zi) = kC(W)
where the last two equalities follow from the fact that the chan-
nel 〈{0, 1}, Z , W〉 is memoryless and symmetric.
Now suppose that the input to our encoder function E (·, ·) is
a message chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}k along with
e = 0. This is a special case of the situation considered in Lem-
ma 5, with the set S given by (27). Hence I(U; Z) > kC(W),
and security condition (2) cannot be satisfied: a significant frac-
tion of message bits, at least C(W), is potentially exposed. 
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We note that the foregoing remark illustrates a general result.
It is known that (2) cannot be satisfied unless the encoder makes
use of at least I(X; Z) random bits, where I(X; Z) is the mutual
information between the input and output of Eve’s channel [27].
V. WEAK SECURITY
In this section, we prove that the coding scheme of the previous
section satisfies the reliability and security conditions (1) and (2)
while its rate k/n approaches the secrecy capacity.
The reliability of this coding scheme follows immediately
from Proposition 3. Let V̂ denote the random vector at the out-
put of the successive cancellation decoder for Cn(A∪R) in-
voked by our decoding algorithm, and note that the correspond-
ing probability of block error is upper bounded by (16). Since
Û = V̂A and A∪R = Gn(W∗, β) by design, we see that
Pr
{
Û 6= U} 6 ∑
i∈A∪R
Z(W∗i ) 6 2
−nβ (30)
Since n > k, this clearly implies that limk→∞Pr
{
Û 6=U} = 0
as required in (1), and the reliability condition is satisfied.
We now turn to the proof of security. For the remainder of
this section, the sets R, A, B are given by (26) – (28), U de-
notes Alice’s message, V denotes the intermediate vector con-
structed by our encoding algorithm (with VA=U, VB = 0, and
VR uniform over {0, 1}r), and Z denotes Eve’s observations.
Also |A|= k, |R|= r, and h2(·) is the binary entropy function.
Lemma 6.
H
(
VR|Z, VA
)
6 h2
(
2−n
β)
+ r 2−n
β
Proof. Suppose that in addition to her observations Z, a ge-
nie reveals to Eve the realization vA of VA and asks her to pro-
duce an estimate of VR. Eve also knows that VB = 0. Thus she
knows all the bits of VRc . Since R = Gn(W, β), this is precise-
ly the scenario considered in (24). Consequently, Eve can use
successive cancellation decoding to deterministically compute
an estimate V̂R = f (Z, VA) such that
λ
def
= Pr
{
V̂R 6= VR
}
6 ∑
i∈R
Z(Wi) 6 2
−nβ (31)
We now invoke Fano’s inequality [11, p. 38] to bound the con-
ditional entropy H(VR|Z, VA) in terms of λ as follows
H
(
VR|Z, VA
)
6 h2(λ) + rλ (32)
where we have also used the fact that VR takes values in the set
{0, 1}r of size 2r. The lemma now follows from (31), (32), and
the fact that h2(·) is increasing on the interval [0, 1/2].
Let us define ǫn
def
= C(W)− |R|/n. Since R = Gn(W, β),
Theorem 1 implies that limn→∞ ǫn = 0.
Lemma 7.
I(U; Z) 6 nǫn + h2
(
2−n
β)
+ (n− k) 2−nβ (33)
Proof. The lemma is proved via a long sequence of simple
equalities and inequalities, as follows:
I(U; Z) = I(VA; Z) = I(VA∪ B ; Z) (34)
= I(V; Z)− I(VR; Z|VA∪ B) (35)
= I(V; Z)− I(VR; Z|VA) (36)
= I(V; Z)− H(VR|VA) + H(VR|Z, VA) (37)
= I(V; Z)− H(VR) + H(VR|Z, VA) (38)
= I(V; Z)− r + H(VR|Z, VA) (39)
6 n C(W)− r + H(VR|Z, VA) (40)
= nǫn + H(VR|Z, VA) (41)
6 nǫn + h2
(
2−n
β)
+ r 2−n
β (42)
6 nǫn + h2
(
2−n
β)
+ (n− k) 2−nβ (43)
The equalities in (34) hold since VA = U and VB = 0. Now ob-
serve that A∪ B and R are complements of each other in [n].
Hence, any distribution of V can be thought of as a joint distri-
bution of VR and VA∪ B . Given this observation, (35) follows
from the chain rule for mutual information. The equality in (36)
is trivial from VB = 0, while (37) is the definition of conditio-
nal mutual information. The equalities (38) and (39) hold since
VR and VA are independent, and VR is a priori uniform over
{0, 1}r. Inequality (40) is immediate from the fact that C(W) is
the capacity of W, while (41) follows from the definition of ǫn.
Finally, (42) follows from Lemma 6 and (43) is trivial.
Theorem 8. The encoding algorithm of the previous section sat-
isfies the weak security condition (2), namely
lim
k→∞
I(U; Z)
k
= 0
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 7. Divide both
sides of (33) by n to get
I(U; Z)
n
6 ǫn +
h
(
2−nβ
)
n
+
n− k
n
2−n
β (44)
It is clear that the last two terms in (44) tend to zero as n →∞,
and limn→∞ ǫn = 0 by Theorem 1. Along with the obvious fact
that k = Ω(n), this completes the proof of the theorem.
Recall that for the wiretap-channel systems considered in this
paper, the secrecy capacity is Cs = C(W∗) − C(W) (cf. Sec-
tion II). Let Rn = k/n denote the rate of our coding scheme.
Theorem 9.
lim
n→∞Rn = C(W
∗)− C(W)
Proof. Observe that
Rn =
|A|
n
=
|Gn(W∗, β)|
n
− |Gn(W, β)|
n
(45)
where we have used the definition of A in (27) and the fact that
Gn(W, β) is a subset of Gn(W∗, β) for all β < 1/2. The theorem
now follows from Theorem 1.
Theorem 9 does not directly imply that our coding scheme
achieves secrecy capacity, because the rate of communication
from Alice to Bob, measured in information bits per channel use,
could be much less than k/n when H(U)< k. But this is true
for any encoder that converts k input bits to n coded output bits.
If the encoder accommodates an arbitrary distribution on its in-
put U, it can achieve capacity only when H(U) = k
(
1− o(1)).
If this necessary condition is satisfied, then our coding scheme
does achieve secrecy capacity by Theorem 9.
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VI. STRONG SECURITY
This section shows how polar coding could be used to provide
strong security whenever the main channel C1 and the wiretap
channel C2 are symmetric binary-input DMCs, and C2 is de-
graded with respect to C1. Specifically, we describe a polar cod-
ing scheme that satisfies the strong security condition (3), while
operating at a rate k/n that approaches the secrecy capacity.
First, we will introduce a subtle but important change in the
coding scheme of Section IV (see Section VI-B). In order to
show that this change suffices to guarantee strong security, we
need to replace the proof in the previous section by a more in-
tricate argument (see Section VI-D). This argument relies cru-
cially on the fact that a certain composite channel induced by
our construction is symmetric (Section VI-C). Aided by a recent
result of Hassani and Urbanke [16], we then prove that the rate
of the proposed coding scheme approaches the secrecy capacity
(Section VI-E). Unfortunately, we can show that the reliability
condition (1) is satisfied only for the case where the main chan-
nel is noiseless. Nevertheless, we believe that, in practice, low
probabilities of block error can be achieved also when the main
channel is not noiseless, using a modification of Arıkan’s suc-
cessive cancellation decoder (Section VI-F).
A. Analysis of the Weak-Security Coding Scheme
Henceforth, let us refer to the coding scheme introduced in Sec-
tion IV and analyzed in the previous section as the weak-secu-
rity coding scheme. A natural question is whether this coding
scheme does, in fact, provide strong security. Although we do
not have a definitive answer to this question, we conjecture that
it does not. As before, let
ǫn
def
= C(W) − |R|
n
= C(W) − |Gn(W, β)|
n
(46)
with the sets R and Gn(W, β) defined as in (26) and (13). The
following result provides some evidence for this conjecture.
Proposition10. Whenever the wiretap channel is a binary-input
symmetric DMC and the main channel is noiseless, the weak-
security coding scheme achieves strong security if and only if
lim
n→∞ nǫn = 0 (47)
Proof. The fact that (47) is sufficient for strong security is ob-
vious from Lemma 7, since the last two terms in (33) tend to
zero exponentially fast. In fact, it is clear that (47) is sufficient
for strong security, whether the main channel is noiseless or not.
We now show that this condition is also necessary, at least in the
case where the main channel is noiseless. In this case, the set B
in (28) is empty, and the vector V at the input to the transfor-
mation (5) consists of VA = U and VR, with VR being uniform
over {0, 1}r. Hence, if the message U is a priori uniform over
{0, 1}k, then V is uniform over {0, 1}n. Let X =VGn as in (5).
Since the Arıkan transform matrix Gn is nonsingular, X is also
uniform over {0, 1}n. Consequently, we have
I(V; Z) = I(X; Z) =
n
∑
i=1
I(Xi, Zi) = nC(W) (48)
where the second equality follows by noting that X1, X2, . . . , Xn
are i.i.d. Ber(1/2) random variables and W is memoryless, while
the last equality follows from the fact that W is symmetric.
This implies that the inequality (40) in the proof of Lemma 7
becomes an equality in this case. Therefore
I(U; Z) = nǫn + H(VR|Z, VA) > nǫn (49)
It is now clear that limn→∞ nǫn = 0 is necessary for the mutual
information I(U; Z) to vanish asymptotically.
Given a BSM channel W, is it true that limn→∞ nǫn = 0 for
this channel? Unfortunately, the answer to this question is nega-
tive. It is known [34,36] that for any discrete memoryless chan-
nel W and any code of length n and rate R that achieves error-
probability Pe on W, we have
C(W)− R > const(Pe, W)√
n
− O
(
log n
n
)
where the constant (which is given explicitly in [34]) depends
on W and Pe, but not on n. This implies that nǫn = Ω(
√
n),
and the weak-security coding scheme does not provide strong
security. Consequently, in order to provide strong security, the
polar coding scheme of Section IV has to be modified.
B. Strong-Security Coding Scheme
Intuitively, the main reason that the coding scheme of Section IV
fails to provide strong security is this: the bit-channels that are
deemed bad for Eve are not bad enough. Indeed, according to
the definition of Bn(W, β) in (14), a bit-channel Wi is consid-
ered bad for Eve whenever Z(Wi) > 2−n
β
/n. For example, if
n = 210 and β = 0.499, a bit-channel may be declared bad for
Eve even when its capacity is greater than 1− 10−9 while Eve’s
probability of error on this channel is less than 2·10−10. It is ob-
vious that such a bit-channel does not prevent Eve from deduc-
ing the information at its input with high probability.
The problem is that the generally accepted definitions of good
and bad bit-channels — for example, (13) and (14) — are moti-
vated by Bob’s point of view. First, a criterion for “goodness” is
established, motivated by the probability of error on Bob’s side,
then the bit-channels that do not satisfy this criterion are deemed
bad. In order to achieve strong security, we will re-define things
from Eve’s point of view. First, we introduce a strong criterion
for “badness,” and then make sure that random bits are sent over
all the bit-channels that do not satisfy this criterion. Specifically,
given a BSM channel W and a positive δ < 1, we define the
index set of δ-poor bit-channels as follows:
Pn(W, δ) def=
{
i ∈ [n] : C(Wi) 6 δ
}
(50)
Further, we leave the definition of the good bit-channels in (13)
unchanged, but re-define the sets R, A, and B as follows:
R def= [n] \ Pn(W, δn) (51)
A def= Pn(W, δn) ∩ Gn(W∗, β) (52)
B def= Pn(W, δn) \ Gn(W∗, β) (53)
where, for the time being, δn is an arbitrary function from the
positive integers to the interval (0, 1). We will specify this func-
tion precisely later in this section (cf. Theorem 17 and Proposi-
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Figure 2. Informal sketch of the strong-security coding scheme
tion 20). In the meantime, notice that the sets R, A, and B, as
defined in (51) – (53), are still disjoint and R∪A ∪B = [n].
The strong-security coding scheme of (51) – (53) is illustrat-
ed schematically in Figure 2, wherein the bold square represents
the set of n bit-channels. This set is partitioned two ways: into
bit-channels that are good for Bob and bad for Bob (as before),
and into bit-channels that are δn-poor and not δn-poor for Eve.
The sets X and Y , with X ∪Y = R, will be discussed later in
this section (see (94), (95) and Section VI-F).
With the new definitions of the sets R, A, B in (51) – (53),
the encoding and decoding algorithms for the strong-security
coding scheme are exactly those given in Section IV for the
weak-security coding scheme (although we will modify the de-
coding algorithm somewhat in Section VI-F).
C. The Induced Channel Is Symmetric
We prove in the next subsection that the strong-security cod-
ing scheme indeed provides strong security. In order to do so,
we first introduce and study a certain composite channel in-
duced by our construction. Informally, this channel describes
the transformation in (5) in the case where some r of the bits
V1, V2, . . . , Vn are set independently and uniformly at random,
while the remaining n − r bits serve as the input to the chan-
nel. This situation is depicted in Figure 3. Formally, the induced
channel Qn(W,R) is specified in terms of an arbitrary BSM
channel W with output alphabet Z , and a subsetR of [n] of size
|R| = r. The input alphabet of Qn(W,R) is {0, 1}n−r and its
output alphabet is Z n. To describe the transition probabilities
of Qn(W,R), let us introduce the following notation. Hence-
forth, given a vector x ∈{0, 1}n−r and a vector e ∈{0, 1}r, let
(x ; e) denote the vector v∈{0, 1}n with vR = e and vRc = x.
With this, referring to the definition of Wn in (9), the 2n−r×|Z |n
transition-probability matrix Q of Qn(W,R) is given by
Q(z|x) def= 1
2r ∑
e∈{0,1}r
Wn
(
z
∣∣ (x ; e)Gn) (54)
for all x ∈{0, 1}n−r and all z ∈Z n. It can be readily seen that
if V = (V1, V2, . . . , Vn−r) is the random vector at the input to
the channel in Figure 3 and Z = (Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn) is the random
vector at the channel output, then indeed
Q(z|x) = Pr{Z= z ∣∣V = x} (55)
Our main goal in this subsection is to show that the induced
channel Qn(W,R) in Figure 3 is symmetric. This follows as a
special case of the more general results in [5]. Although [5] pre-
cedes this paper chronologically, it is not yet publicly available.
Therefore, we include a complete proof for completeness.
Recall that a group action of an abelian group A on a set Y
is a function from A×Y to Y , denoted (a, y) 7→ a.y, with the
following properties:
P1. 0.y = y for all y∈Y , where 0 is the identity of A;
P2. (a + b).y = a.(b.y) for all a, b ∈ A and all y∈Y ,
where + denotes the group operation.
The orbit of y ∈Y is the set of all points of Y to which y can
be moved by the elements of A. Explicitly, the orbit of y is
O(y) def= { a.y : a ∈ A} (56)
It is well known that orbits of points in Y form a partition of Y
into equivalence classes (under the equivalence relation y1∼ y2
iff there exists an a ∈ A with y2 = a.y1).
Theorem 11. Let
〈
X , Y , W
〉
be a DMC, and suppose that X
is an abelian group under the binary operation +. Further, sup-
pose that there exists a group action . of X on Y such that
W(y|a + x) = W(a.y|x) (57)
for all a, x ∈X and all y ∈Y . Then the DMC 〈X , Y , W〉 is
necessarily a symmetric channel.
Proof. We partition the set Y into orbits formed by the group
action . of X . Let O be an orbit, and let M be the |X | × |O|
column submatrix of W consisting of those columns that are
indexed by the elements of O. It would suffice to prove that M
is a strongly symmetric matrix, regardless of the choice of O.
Consider two arbitrary rows of M indexed, say, by the ele-
ments x1∈X and x2∈X . Set a = x2 + (−x1), where −x1 is
the inverse of x1 in the group X . Then we have x2 = a + x1.
Therefore, (57) implies that
W(y|x2) = W(a.y|x1) for all y∈Y (58)
It is easy to see from (56) and property P2 that the map y 7→ a.y
is bijective on O. Together with (58), this shows that the rows
of M, indexed by x1 and x2, are permutations of each other.
Now consider two arbitrary columns of M indexed by the el-
ements y1∈O and y2 ∈O. Then, by the definition of an orbit,
there exists an a∈X such that y2 = a.y1, and (57) implies that
W(y2|x) = W(y1|a + x) for all x ∈X (59)
It is clear that the map x 7→ a + x is bijective on X . Thus (59)
shows that the columns of M are permutations of each other.
Notice that the input alphabet {0, 1}n−r of Qn(W,R) is an
abelian group, with the group operation + being the compo-
nentwise modulo 2 addition of vectors in F n−r2 . Consequently,
in order to prove that the channel Qn(W,R) is symmetric, it
would suffice to construct a group action of {0, 1}n−r on Z n
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Figure 3. Block diagram of the induced channel Qn(W,R)
that satisfies (57). To do so, we will use the fact that W itself is
symmetric. As noted by Arıkan [3], a binary-input channel W
with output alphabet Z is symmetric if and only if there exists
a permutation π1 on Z such that
π1 = π
−1
1 (π1 is an involution) (60)
W
(
z|0) = W(π1(z)|1) for all z ∈Z (61)
Let π0 be the identity permutation on Z . Following Arıkan [3],
let us define a group action of the additive group of F2 = {0, 1}
on the set Z as follows: x.z = πx(z) for all x ∈F2 and z∈Z .
It is trivial to verify that x.z has the required group-action prop-
erties P1 and P2, and that for all a, x ∈F2 and z∈Z , we have
W(z |a + x) = W(a.z |x) (62)
As in [3], we can extend this function componentwise to a group
action of the additive group of F n2 on the set Z n as follows:
x.z
def
= (x1.z1, x2.z2, . . . , xn.zn) (63)
The following lemma was proved by Arıkan in [3, Propositions
12 and 13]. We provide a simple proof herein, for completeness.
Lemma 12. Let Gn = PnG⊗m be the Arıkan transform matrix.
Then for all a, x∈F n2 and all z∈Z n, we have
Wn
(
z |(a + x)Gn
)
= Wn
(
aGn.z |xGn
) (64)
Proof. In fact, the lemma is true for an arbitrary n× n binary
matrix (in other words, any linear transformation from F n2 to it-
self). First, let us show that
Wn(z |b + c) = Wn(b.z |c) (65)
for all b, c∈F n2 and all z∈Z n. This follows directly from the
definition of Wn. Indeed, expanding both sides of (65) as
n
∏
i=1
W(zi|bi + ci) =
n
∏
i=1
W(bi.zi|ci)
we conclude that (65) is implied by (62). Let us now set b= aGn
and c = xGn. Then the lemma follows from (65) along with the
fact that multiplication by a matrix is a linear operation, that is
(a + x)Gn = aGn + xGn = b + c.
We now depart from Arıkan [3], and introduce a group action
◦ of the additive group of F n−r2 on Z n, defined as follows. Re-
call that (x, e) denotes the vector v∈ {0, 1}n with vR = e and
vRc = x. With this, we define for all x∈F n−r2 and all z∈Z n
x ◦ z def= (x ; 0)Gn.z (66)
where the group action . on the right-hand side is the one defin-
ed in (63). Again, it is easy to verify that (66) satisfies P1 and P2.
Our main result in this subsection is the following proposition.
Proposition13. The induced channelQn(W,R) is symmetric.
Proof. In light of Theorem 11, it would suffice to prove that
the transition-probability matrix Q defined in (54) satisfies
Q(z |a + x) = Q(a ◦ z |x)
for all a, x∈F n−r2 and z∈Z n. Expanding the vector (a+ x ; e)
as (a ; 0) + (x ; e), and substituting in (54), we obtain
Q(z |a+ x) = 1
2r ∑
e∈{0,1}r
Wn
(
z
∣∣ ((a ; 0) + (x ; e))Gn) (67)
=
1
2r ∑
e∈{0,1}r
Wn
(
(a ; 0)Gn.z
∣∣ (x ; e)Gn) (68)
=
1
2r ∑
e∈{0,1}r
Wn
(
a ◦ z ∣∣(x ; e)Gn) (69)
where (68) follows from Lemma 12 and (69) follows from (66).
But (69) is precisely Q(a ◦ z |x) by (54), and we are done.
D. Proof of Strong Security
Let us begin with a simple lemma that relates the capacity of the
bit-channels in (11) to the transformation in (5). Although this
lemma is well-known, we include a proof for completeness.
Lemma 14. Let W be an arbitrary BSM channel. Suppose the
vector V = (V1, V2, . . . , Vn) at the input to the transformation
in (5) is uniform over {0, 1}n, and let Z = (Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn) be
the random vector at the output of the transformation. Further,
let W1, W2, . . . , Wn be the corresponding bit-channels, defined
in (11). Then for all i ∈ [n], the capacity of Wi is given by
C(Wi) = I(Vi ; Z, V1, V2, . . . , Vi−1)
Proof. Let Vi denote the random vector (V1, V2, . . . , Vi) for
all i ∈ [n], as before. It is shown in [3] that if W is symmetric,
then so is Wi for all i ∈ [n]. Hence, the capacity of Wi is the
mutual information between its input and output when the input
is uniform over {0, 1}. Thus it would suffice to show that
Wi
(
z, v |x) = Pr{Z = z, Vi−1 = v ∣∣Vi = x} (70)
for all z∈Z n, v∈{0, 1}i−1, and x ∈{0, 1}. Since Vi is uniform
we can re-write the right-hand side of (70) as follows:
Pr
{
Z = z, Vi−1 = v, Vi = x
}
Pr
{
Vi = x
} = 2 Pr{Z = z, Vi = (v, x)}
Observe that the event
{
Vi = (v, x)
}
is the union of 2n−i dis-
joint events {V = (v, x, v)}, as v ranges over {0, 1}n−i (or v
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is the empty string, if i = n). Since V is uniform over {0, 1}n,
the probability of each such event is 2−n. Consequently
2 Pr
{
Z = z, Vi = (v, x)
}
=
= 2 ∑
v∈{0,1}n−i
Pr
{
Z = z, V = (v, x, v)
} (71)
=
1
2n−1 ∑
v∈{0,1}n−i
Pr
{
Z = z
∣∣V = (v, x, v)} (72)
Since Z and V are, respectively, the output and the input to the
transformation in (5), for all w ∈ {0, 1}n we have
Pr
{
Z = z
∣∣V = w} = Wn(z ∣∣w PnG⊗m) = W˜(z|w)
by the definition of the “combined” channel W˜ in (10). Together
with (72) and the definition of Wi in (11), this shows that the
right-hand side of (70) is indeed equal to Wi
(
z, v |x).
The next lemma combines Proposition 13 with Lemma 14 to
upper-bound the capacity of the induced channel Qn(W,R).
Lemma 15. Let W be an arbitrary BSM channel. For n = 2m,
let W1,W2, . . . ,Wn denote the corresponding bit-channels.Then
for all R ⊂ [n], the capacity of the induced channelQn(W,R),
defined in (54), is upper-bounded as follows:
C(Qn(W,R)) 6 ∑
i∈Rc
C(Wi) (73)
Proof. Consider again the transformation in (5), with the input
vector V = (V1, V2, . . . , Vn) being uniform over {0, 1}n, and let
Z = (Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn) denote the output of the transformation,
as in Lemma 14. Then
C(Qn(W,R)) = I(VRc ; Z) (74)
This is so because Qn(W,R) is symmetric by Proposition 13,
and the capacity of a symmetric DMC is given by the mutual
information between its input and output, under uniform input
distribution [14, Theorem 4.5.2]. Next, write Rc = [n] \R as
Rc = {i1, i2, . . . , in−r}
where r = |R|, and assume w.l.o.g. that i1 < i2 < · · · < in−r.
The lemma can be now proved via a sequence of simple equal-
ities and inequalities, as follows:
I(VRc ; Z) = I
(
Vi1 , Vi1 , . . . , Vin−r ; Z
) (75)
=
n−r
∑
j=1
I
(
Vi j ; Z
∣∣Vi1 ,Vi2 , . . . ,Vi j−1) (76)
=
n−r
∑
j=1
I
(
Vi j ; Z, Vi1 ,Vi2 , . . . ,Vi j−1
) (77)
6
n−r
∑
j=1
I
(
Vi j ; Z, V1,V2, . . . ,Vi j−1
) (78)
The equality (76) is the chain rule for mutual information. The
equality (77) follows from the fact that I(X ; Z|Y) = I(X ; Z, Y)
for all random variables X, Y, Z such that X and Y are indepen-
dent. To establish (78), we adjoin to the set of random variables
{Vi1 ,Vi2 , . . . ,Vi j−1} its complement in the set {V1,V2, . . . ,Vi j}.
Clearly, this cannot decrease the mutual information. Lastly, we
observe that the summation in (78) is equal to the summation
on the right-hand side of (73) by Lemma 14.
With Lemma 15 in hand, we are finally ready to establish our
main result in this section.
Proposition16. Let U be the message at the input to the enco-
der for the strong-security coding scheme. Then, regardless of
the a priori distribution of U, we have
I(U; Z) 6 δn|Pn(W, δn)| (79)
where Z is the output of the wiretap channel, and Pn(W, δn) is
the index set of δn-poor bit-channels, as defined in (50).
Proof. Recall that our encoder first constructs the vector V
with VA = U, VB = 0, and VR uniform over {0, 1}r. Hence
I(U ; Z) = I(VA ; Z) = I(VA∪ B ; Z)
Since the sets A, B, R partition [n], the vector VA ∪ B can be
regarded as the input to the induced channelQn(W,R). More-
over, since Rc = Pn(W, δn) by (51), Lemma 15 implies that
I(VA∪ B ; Z) 6 C
(Qn(W,R)) 6 ∑
i∈Pn(W, δn)
C(Wi)
The proposition now follows by observing that C(Wi) 6 δn for
all i∈Pn(W, δn), by the definition of Pn(W, δn) in (50).
Note that we are still free to specify the function δn in (51)
and (79). This means that the security of our coding scheme
is tunable. Let us henceforth refer to δn as the security func-
tion; this function is a design parameter in our scheme. Propo-
sition 16 implies that choosing different settings for the security
function guarantees different levels of security.
Theorem 17. For any security function such that δn = o(1/n),
the strong-security coding scheme guarantees strong security.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 16, along with the definition
of strong security in (3) and the fact that |Pn(W, δn)| 6 n.
In fact, we shall see in the next subsection (cf. Theorem 21)
that we can achieve the secrecy capacity, while setting the secu-
rity function to be as small as δn = 2−n
β for any positive con-
stant β< 1/2. In this case, our coding scheme guarantees that the
mutual information between the message U and Eve’s observa-
tions Z scales roughly as
I(U ; Z) = o
(
2−
√
n/nε
)
(80)
for any ε> 0. Note that this holds regardless of the a priori dis-
tribution of the message.
E. Rate of the Strong-Security Coding Scheme
Let Rn = k/n = |A|/n denote the rate of the strong-security
coding scheme, where A is the set defined in (52). Note that
A = Pn(W, δn) \ Bn(W∗, β)
since the sets Gn(W∗, β) and Bn(W∗, β) of good and bad chan-
nels in (13), (14) are complements of each other. It follows that
Rn >
|Pn(W, δn)|
n
− |Bn(W
∗, β)|
n
(81)
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The asymptotic behavior of the fraction |Bn(W∗, β)|/n is given
by Theorem 1. Therefore, in order to prove that the rate of the
strong-security coding scheme approaches secrecy capacity, it
remains to analyze the asymptotic behavior of |Pn(W, δn)|/n.
In this regard, a recent result of Hassani and Urbanke [16]
will be useful. To describe this result, we need to introduce some
notation. Given a BSM channel W and a positive γ < 1, let
P ′n(W, γ) def=
{
i ∈ [n] : Z(Wi) > 1− γ
}
(82)
This is similar to the definition of the set Pn(W, δ) in (50), ex-
cept that (82) uses the Bhattacharyya parameters Z(Wi) instead
of the channel capacities C(Wi). Given a positive integer m and
a real number ξ in the open interval (0, 1), let a = a(m, ξ) de-
note the unique positive integer such that
m
∑
i=a
(
m
i
)
6 ξ 2m <
m
∑
i=a−1
(
m
i
)
(83)
and define α(m, ξ) def= a(m, ξ)/m. Further, we say that a func-
tion f (m) from the positive integers to the interval (0, 1) is in
the intersection of o(1/√m) and ω(1/m) if
lim
m→∞
(√
m f (m)
)
= 0 and lim
m→∞
(
m f (m)
)
= ∞
The following is (the second part of) Theorem 3 of Hassani and
Urbanke [16]. Although this result is more general than what
we need, we state it below exactly as in [16, Theorem 3].
Theorem 18. Let W be a BSM channel, and let ξ< 1 be a posi-
tive constant. Fix an arbitrary function f (m) in the intersection
of o
(
1/
√
m
)
and ω(1/m), and for all n = 2m define
γn
def
= 2−n
α(m,ξ)(1+ f (m)) (84)
where α(m, ξ) is the function defined in (83). Then the asymp-
totic behavior of the fraction |P ′n(W, γn)|/n is given by
lim
n→∞
|P ′n(W, γn)|
n
= ξ
(
1− C(W)) (85)
In Corollary 19 and Proposition 20, we specialize the general
result of Theorem 18 to our needs.
Corollary19. Let W be an arbitrary BSM channel. Then for
any positive constant β < 1/2 we have
lim
n→∞
∣∣P ′n(W, 2−nβ)∣∣
n
= 1− C(W) (86)
Proof. Applying the Stirling formula to both sides of (83), it
can be shown (cf. [16]) that
a(m, ξ) =
m
2
+
Q−1(ξ)
2
√
m + o
(√
m
)
where Q(x) is the probability that a standard normal random
variable will obtain a value larger than x. Consequently, for all
positive ξ < 1, there exists a positive constant cξ such that
a(m, ξ) >
m
2
− cξ
√
m
for all sufficiently large m. This implies that for any positive
constant β < 1/2, any function f (m) from the positive integers
to the interval (0, 1), and for all sufficiently large m, the follow-
ing inequality holds
α(m, ξ)
(
1 + f (m)
)
>
a(m, ξ)
m
>
1
2
− cξ√
m
> β
This, in turn, implies that for all sufficiently large n = 2m, we
have γn < 2−n
β
where γn is the function defined in (84). There-
fore, the set P ′n(W, γn) is a subset of the set P ′n(W, 2−nβ) for
all sufficiently large n.
Let us assume for a moment that the limit on the left-hand
side of (86) exists, call it L. If so, we can conclude from Theo-
rem 18, along with the fact thatP ′n(W, γn) ⊂ P ′n(W, 2−n
β
) for
all sufficiently large n, that
lim
n→∞
∣∣P ′n(W, 2−nβ)∣∣
n
> lim
n→∞
|P ′n(W,γn)|
n
= ξ
(
1− C(W))
Since this holds for all positive ξ < 1, the lowest possible value
of L is 1− C(W). Now observe that the set P ′n(W, 2−n
β
) and
the set Gn(W, β) of good channels, defined in (13), do not in-
tersect. Therefore, for all n = 2m we have∣∣P ′n(W, 2−nβ)∣∣
n
6 1 − |Gn(W, β)|
n
Together with Theorem 1, this implies that the limit L indeed ex-
ists, and is equal to 1− C(W).
Proposition20. Let W be an arbitrary BSM channel, and let
β < 1/2 be a positive constant. Further, let Pn(W, δn) be the in-
dex set of δn-poor bit-channels, as defined in (50), and suppose
that there exist positive constants c1 and c2 such that
c12
−nβ 6 δn 6 1− c2 (87)
for all sufficiently large n. Then the asymptotic behavior of the
fraction |Pn(W, δn)|/n is given by
lim
n→∞
|Pn(W, δn)|
n
= 1− C(W) (88)
Proof. Let W1, W2, . . . , Wn denote the bit-channels, as be-
fore. It was shown by Arıkan in [3, Proposition 1] that
C(Wi) 6
√
1− Z(Wi)2 (89)
for all i∈ [n]. Fix a positive constant α such that β < α < 1/2.
Since Z(Wi) > 1− 2−nα for all i ∈P ′n(W, 2−nα) by definition,
Arıkan’s bound (89) implies that
C(Wi) 6 2−(n
α−1)/2 (90)
for i ∈P ′n(W, 2−nα). For all sufficiently large n, the right-hand
side of (90) is less than the left-hand side of (87), and therefore
P ′n(W, 2−n
α
) ⊆ Pn(W, δn) (91)
Also note that the condition δn 6 1− c2 on the right-hand side
of (87) implies that for all sufficiently large n, we have
Pn(W, δn) ∩ Gn(W, β) = ∅ (92)
The proposition now follows by combining (91) and (92) with
Corollary 19 and Theorem 1, respectively.
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We are now ready to prove that for a wide range of security
functions, our strong-security coding scheme operates at a rate
that approaches the secrecy capacity.
Theorem 21. For any security function δn that satisfies (87), the
rate Rn of the corresponding strong-security coding scheme ap-
proaches the secrecy capacity, namely
lim
n→∞Rn = C(W
∗)− C(W) (93)
Proof. A lower bound on the rate Rn is given in (81). Along
with Proposition 20 and Theorem 1, this immediately shows that
limn→∞ Rn > C(W∗)− C(W). In order to establish equality
in (93), let us partition the setR = [n] \Pn(W, δn) in (51) into
two subsets, as in Figure 2. These subsets are defined as follows:
X def= R∩ Bn(W∗, β) (94)
Y def= R∩ Gn(W∗, β) (95)
Note that the set X in (94) and the set B in (53) form a partition
of Bn(W∗, β), as illustrated in Figure 2. It follows that
Rn =
|Pn(W, δn)|
n
− |Bn(W
∗, β)|
n
+
|X |
n
(96)
We will show in Proposition 22 of the next subsection that the
fraction |X |/n vanishes as n → ∞. With this, the theorem fol-
lows from (96), Proposition 20, and Theorem 1.
F. Reliability of the Strong-Security Coding Scheme
If the main channel W∗ is noiseless, Bob can trivially recover
the message with probability 1 as follows. Bob receives the vec-
tor Y = VGn. Since the Arıkan transform matrix Gn = PnG⊗m
is its own inverse over F2, Bob can compute V = YGn and set
Û =VA. Clearly Û = U, and condition (1) is trivially satisfied.
What happens if the main channel W∗ is not noiseless? Sup-
pose that Bob attempts to use the successive cancellation deco-
der, as in Section V. Then, according to Theorem 2 and Propo-
sition 3, Bob’s probability of error is upper-bounded by the sum
of the Bhattacharyya parameters Z(W∗i ) of those bit-channels
that are not fixed (to zero). The index set of the bit-channels that
are not fixed in our strong-security coding scheme is given by
A∪R = Gn(W∗, β) ∪ X
whereX is the set defined in (94). The sum of the Bhattacharya
parameters Z(W∗i ) over the set Gn(W∗, β) is bounded by 2−n
β
by definition, and therefore
Pr
{
Û 6= U} 6 2−nβ + ∑
i∈X
Z(W∗i ) (97)
Unfortunately, we are not aware of any useful bounds on the
sum ∑ i∈X Z(W∗i ). Thus we do not have a proof that the strong-
security coding scheme satisfies the reliability condition (1).
Observe, however, that the security and reliability require-
ments are fundamentally different. Whether we’re interested in
the theory or in the practice of wiretap channels, security al-
ways requires a proof. It cannot be established through a com-
putational procedure, such as simulation. On the other hand, re-
liability can be (and often is) established through computation
in practice. For example, it is very common to rely on simu-
lations to verify the reliability performance of error-correcting
codes. We believe that, in practice, our strong-security coding
scheme can be decoded to achieve low probabilities of error.
First, the following proposition shows that if W is degraded
with respect to W∗, then the set X that gives us trouble in suc-
cessive cancellation decoding is small.
Proposition22. Let X be the index set of bit-channels that are
not δn-poor for Eve yet bad for Bob, as defined in (94). Then
lim
n→∞
|X |
n
= 0
for any security function δn that satisfies (87), provided Eve’s
channel W is degraded with respect to Bob’s channel W∗.
Proof. We claim that the sets X , Gn(W∗, β), and Pn(W∗, δn)
are pairwise disjoint, and therefore
|X |
n
+
|Gn(W∗, β)|
n
+
|Pn(W∗, δn)|
n
6 1 (98)
SinceX ⊆ Bn(W∗, β) by definition, and Bn(W∗, β) is the com-
plement of Gn(W∗, β), it is clear thatX ∩Gn(W∗, β) = ∅. It is
also clear that Pn(W∗, δn) ∩ Gn(W∗, β) = ∅, as in (92). Fur-
thermore, sinceX ⊆R andR = [n]\Pn(W, δn) by definition,
we have X ∩Pn(W, δn) = ∅. Consequently, in order to prove
our claim in (98), it would suffice to show that
Pn(W∗, δn) ⊆ Pn(W, δn)
But this follows immediately from Lemma 4 along with the def-
inition of the set of δn-poor channels in (50). Now observe that
as n → ∞, the fraction |Gn(W∗, β)|/n converges to the capac-
ity C(W∗) by Theorem 1, whereas the fraction |Pn(W∗, δn)|/n
converges to 1−C(W∗) by Proposition 20. Together with (98),
this completes the proof of the proposition.
Depending upon how small the set X turns out to be in prac-
tice, various decoding solutions are potentially applicable.
First, it is quite possible that X = ∅ in many situations, es-
pecially if the main channel is much better than the wiretap
channel. In this case, successive cancellation decoding can be
used “as is,” and Bob’s probability of error is at most 2−nβ .
The following example illustrates this situation. In order to
obtain the numerical values given in this example, we have used
the methods of [38] to evaluate the polar bit-channels.
Example. Suppose that both the main channel and the wire-
tap channel are binary symmetric channels, say C1 = BSC(p1)
and C2 = BSC(p2). Let us further assume that p1 = 10−3 and
that the error-rate required at the output of the main-channel de-
coder is 10−9. This is often the case in optical fiber communi-
cations [32]. We will use the polar transformation (5) of length
n = 220. Indeed, codes of this length are already in use today
in proprietary 100 GbE fiber-optic systems. We also adopt the
following stringent security criterion: we require that the mu-
tual information I(U; Z) between messages at the input to our
encoder and observations at the output of the wiretap channel is
less than 10−30. Using the methods developed in this section,
we can simultaneously guarantee reliability of 10−9 and secu-
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rity of 10−30 at communication rates close to the secrecy capa-
city. The following table:
p2 Rate R % of Cs
0.45 0.933 95.1%
0.40 0.882 91.9%
0.35 0.817 88.5%
0.30 0.738 84.8%
0.25 0.647 80.9%
0.20 0.543 76.4%
0.15 0.425 71.1%
0.10 0.293 64.0%
(99)
summarizes these rates as a function of the bit error-rate p2 of
the wiretap channel. The third column in the table gives the ra-
tio R/Cs, expressed as a percentage. Notably, in all of these
cases, we have X =∅. In fact, the set X remains empty un-
til the bit error-rate on the wiretap channel decreases down to
p2 = 0.066, in which case |X | = 1. But the secrecy capacity
for p2 6 0.066 is less than 0.3395, which is probably too small
to be of practical interest (in fiber-optic communications). 
Now suppose that the set X is nonempty. Observe that this
set is fixed and known a priori to all the parties (Alice, Bob, and
Eve). In successive cancellation decoding, Bob makes his de-
cisions v̂1, v̂2, . . . , v̂n sequentially using the decision rule (12).
Bob will know a priori that this decision rule is unreliable when-
ever an index i∈X is reached. Therefore, Bob could follow
both alternatives v̂i = 0 and v̂i = 1 for all i∈X . Doing so in-
creases the decoding complexity by a factor of 2|X |. But if |X |
is a small constant (say, X contains only a couple of bit-chan-
nels), this is not unreasonable.
What can Bob do if the set X is larger? It is well known that
in successive cancellation decoding, a single incorrect decision
affects all the following decisions, making them unreliable. We
propose to take advantage of this phenomenon in order to re-
duce the decoding complexity. Let i1 be the smallest index inX.
Suppose that upon branching with v̂i1 = 0 and v̂i1 = 1, the de-
coder begins to compute the channel noise (e.g. the Hamming
distance to the received vector on a BSC channel) accumulated
along each of the two decision paths being followed. Due to
the “error propagation” induced by the incorrect decision at i1,
we expect this estimated noise to accumulate rapidly along the
incorrect path. On the other hand, along the correct path, the
channel noise should accumulate slowly, governed by the statis-
tics of W∗ that are known a priori. This means that the decoder
can detect, with high probability, which of the two paths being
followed is incorrect. Once the decoder finds that the path with
the higher accumulated noise is sufficiently unlikely, according
to the channel statistics, this path can be safely discarded.
Of course, it is possible that the second smallest index i2∈X
is reached before one of the two paths opened at i1∈X can be
discarded. In this case, the decoder would need to begin follow-
ing four paths. Once the third index i3∈X is reached, the de-
coder might be following 1, 2, 3, or 4 paths. And so on. In prac-
tice, one could design the decoder to follow at most M paths,
where M is a pre-determined limit dictated by the decoder com-
plexity considerations. The situation is quite similar to decision-
feedback equalization on ISI channels using a bank of M zero-
forcing DFEs. That scenario was analyzed in [43], where it is
shown that error-propagation caused by incorrect decisions can
be used to discard erroneous decision-feedback paths. It is also
shown in [43] that, in practice, small values of M often suffice
to achieve very good performance.
We have limited our consideration herein to successive can-
cellation decoding, or variants thereof. It is also possible that
other methods of decoding polar codes (such as belief propaga-
tion [18] or recursive-list decoding [13]) may be relatively ro-
bust to not fixing a small set X of bad channels. Analysis of
such decoders is a research problem of independent interest.
VII. DISCUSSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
We briefly mention certain straightforward extensions of our re-
sults. So far, we have considered exclusively binary-input sym-
metric wiretap channels. However, it is well known that the pol-
arization phenomenon extends to other types of channels. Arı-
kan shows in [3] that, given a non-symmetric binary-input chan-
nel W, polar codes achieve its symmetric capacity I(W) in the
average sense. This implies that our coding scheme achieves the
symmetric capacity difference I(W∗)− I(W), also in the av-
erage sense. Specifically, suppose we modify our encoding algo-
rithm in Section IV as follows. Instead of constructing the vec-
tor v∈{0, 1}n by setting vR = e, vA = u, and vB = 0, we set
vR = e, vA = u, and vB = s, where s is a fixed binary vector
known a priori to all the parties. Then there exists some choice
of s such that Theorem 8 and Theorem 9 hold. Based upon the
results of Arıkan in [3], exactly the same proof as before (Lem-
ma 6 and Lemma 7) applies.
Our results also extend to discrete memoryless channels with
non-binary input. It was recently proved in [35] that channels
with an input alphabet of prime size q are polarized by the same
transformation (5), and the corresponding versions of Theo-
rem 1 and Theorem 2 hold. The probability of error under suc-
cessive cancellation decoding still scales as O(2−nβ) for all
prime q. This means that our proof of Lemmas 6 and 7 goes
through essentially “as is” (as long as r is replaced by r log2 q
throughout). If the size q of the input alphabet is not prime, po-
larization requires either a randomized permutation on the input
or multilevel coding (see [35] for more details). It can be shown
that our results in Section V extend to this case as well.
It is not clear whether the strong-security results of the previ-
ous section can be similarly extended to non-symmetric and/or
to non-binary-input wiretap channels. We believe they can, and
pose a proof of this as an open problem.
Another open problem of great interest is how to code for the
situation where the wiretap channel W in not degraded with re-
spect to the main channel W∗. Note that channel degradation is
sufficient but, to the best of our knowledge, not necessary for
our coding scheme to work. What seems to be necessary is that
the set of bit-channels that are “good” for Eve but “bad” for
Bob is either empty (as in Section V) or at least very small (as
in Section VI). Unfortunately, in the general case, there is no
reason why the number of such bit-channels could not be large.
Finally, we point out that all the constructions in this paper
are only as explicit as the polar codes themselves. An exact al-
gorithm for computing the sets Gn(W, β) and Pn(W, δ) in (13)
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and (50) was given by Arıkan in [3]. However, this algorithm re-
quires time and memory that grow exponentially with the code
length n. Since then, several heuristic algorithms for this prob-
lem have been proposed [2,30,31]. However, these algorithms
do not provide useful guarantees on the quality of their output.
Such guarantees are clearly essential to establish the security of
our coding scheme. Fortunately, the problem has been resolved
in [38]. The algorithm of [38] runs in linear time, and makes it
possible to compute upper and lower bounds on the capacity of
polar bit-channels with an arbitrary degree of precision. For ex-
ample, to establish the results reported in (99), we have run the
algorithm of [38] with a precision of 300 bits (which is necessa-
ry to provide meaningful guarantees of security down to 10−30).
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